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HUGO BLACK AMONG FRIENDS
Dennis J. Hutchinson*
A BIOGRAPHY. By Roger K Newman. New York:
Pantheon. 1994. Pp. xiv, 741. $30.
HUGO BLACK:

To the generation of law students born after Earl Warren retired, Hugo Black, who lived from 1886-1971, is now a shadowy
figure. But to those who came to the profession during the "moral
epoch" of the Warren Court,' Black was the living embodiment of
the liberal judicial ideal. He wrote simply and passionately about
freedom of speech and equal protection of the laws, he was
steadfast against official oppression and petty brutality, and he took
his bearings from the text of the Constitution - a copy was always
tucked in his suit pocket. The image, which Black carefully crafted,
belied an extremely complex personality whose influence on the
Supreme Court went far beyond his own published opinions. Indeed, Black may have been the most influential member of the
Court for the two decades following the outbreak of World War II.
More than any other single Justice, Black molded the agenda of
cases that the Court heard during the period and shaped the terms
of discourse used by the Court to decide those cases. Even further
behind the scenes, Black tacitly influenced scholarly evaluation of
the Court's performance: an ex-clerk would leap to Black's defense
in print 2 when he was criticized, and other allies turned debate over
constitutional issues into a personalized comparison of the virtues
3
of Black and Justice Felix Frankfurter.
To the public, of course, Black was solely a creature of his opinions - brief, highly accessible odes to liberty, which he grounded
in classical thought and constitutional history, and which he insistently tied to the text of the Constitution. These opinions hooked
Roger K. Newman 4 as an undergraduate: "In 1967," he reports in
* Associate Professor, The University of Chicago and Senior Lecturer, University of
Chicago Law School. A.B. 1969, Bowdoin College; LL.M. 1974, University of Texas at Austin; M.A. 1977, Oxford University. - Ed.
1. See Dennis J. Hutchinson, Hail to the Chieft. Earl Warren and the Supreme Court 81
MIcH. L. REv. 922 (1983).
2. See, e.g., JoHN P. FRANi, MR. JUSTICE BLACK: THE MAN A HIs OPwNONs (1948);
John P. Frank, Disqualificationof Judges, 56 YALE L. 605 (1947).
3. See, principally, FREiD RODELL, NnQE MEN: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE SUPREME

COURT FROM 1790-1955, at 264-66, 270-73 (1955); Fred Rodell, Justice Hugo Black, 59 Tim
AmRiUcAN 1MERCURY 135, 142-43 (1944); Fred Rodell, Supreme Court Postscrip4 Tim PROOaREssrvE (May 27, 1946), at 5.
4. Research Scholar, New York University School of Law.
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the Epilogue, entitled "Of Hugo and Me," "I was one of the young
devouring Hugo Black's opinions.... What began as a curiosity
became a frequent preoccupation and then, admittedly, an obsession. The long journey started" (p. 626). The end of the journey,
nearly three decades later, is the most detailed study of Hugo Black
that we have ever had or are likely to have. Mr. Newman has been
tenacious, undaunted by Black's rather petulant decision to burn all
of his conference notes and-many of the materials in his case fies
"You don't seem to want to pay the price of fame," his friend
Virginia Durr chided-(p. 610). The biography, needless to say, is
authorized. Newman's Epilogue acknowledges the energetic support of the. Black family, including both of the Justice's sons and
daughter ("she started as a 'source' and turned into a dear friend"
(p. 631)).
Newman does not imply that his work is designed to satisfy the
Black family, however, and it is hard to see how it could. The most
revealing details in the volume touch on private and sometimes embarrassing personal matters that shed little light on the Justice's
views but appear intended to humanize him - if somewhat darkly.
The resulting portrait is an even more overbearing husband and
domineering father than appears in either the second Mrs. Black's
published diaries5 or Hugo Black, Jr.'s deferential memoir.6 We
learn, for example, that Sterling Black, Jr. - the Justice's grandson
was suspended from public high school for circulating an underground newspaper shortly after the Court heard argument in Tinker
v. Des Moines School District.7 Newman suggests that Black's "vicious harangue" (p. 592) dissenting in Tinker was fueled by his disappointment with both his grandson and with his son, Sterling, the
head of the New Mexico ACLU, who planned to challenge the suspension in court. "If the case ever reaches the [Supreme] Court, I
will disqualify myself not only in it but in every other case in which
the ACLU takes any part, no matter how small." 8 The incident is
arresting, but not as self-explanatory as Newman implies. By 1969,
when the Court decided Tinker, Justice Black had long since publicly abandoned any hint of "absolute" protection for nonverbal
speech. He was testy about sit-ins and flag-burning, and the neces5. EUZA.Emh BLACK, MR. JUSTICE AND MRS. BLACK: THE
BLACK AND ELzABE BLACK (1986).
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6. HUGO BLACK, JR., My FATHER: A RPmiMBRANCE (1975).

7. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
8. Pp. 592-93. It is not clear whether Black's statement came in a letter or in a telegram,
nor is it clear when Sterling Black received it. The footnote and source-citing apparatus in
Newman's book is confusing. Footnote signals appear to drop randomly, and the notes collect abbreviated cites that may span several paragraphs. Too often, specific quotations or
facts lack a specific source. The author is conscious of the problem (p. 634), but his cure is
unsuccessful.
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sity for public order became a frequent theme. At the same time,
the Justice never hesitated to give imperative advice to his children
or to his wives - his first wife died in 1952 - often in fiercely
uncompromising terms. "Vicious harangues" on a range of topics
came frequently at this point in the Justice's life.
Newman's account of Tinker fails to pull Black into sharp focus,
but more importantly, it ignores other work that helps to explain
the tenor of Black's famous dissenting opinion. Laura Kalman's
authorized biography of Justice Abe Fortas reports:
By the 1968 term one of Warren's clerks considered the tension between Black and Fortas "one of the most basic animosities on the
Court." In every case Fortas cared about - In re Gault, Powell v.
Texas, Time v. Hill, Snyder v. Harris,Epperson v. Arkansas, Tinker v.
Des Moines School District- Black was on the other side.... Black
long had contended that the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporated the constitutional guarantees of the first
ten amendments and applied them to the states. It followed that he
would disagree with Fortas, who did not believe in full "incorporation" and who argued that courts properly could interpret due process
as a broad guarantee of fairness.
The feud between the two men also became personal, and one of
their brethren said, "I blame that on Black." 9
Mr. Newman notes before his discussion of Tinker that the "tension" between Black and Fortas "was the only source of true friction on the Court" at the time (p. 590), but he neglects to mention
that Fortas was the author of Tinker or that the flare-up with Black
was only the culmination of a series of pointed, and increasingly
sarcastic, exchanges between the two that had largely remained
within the Court until Tinker.
Perhaps the problem is that Mr. Newman's long-simmering stew
has too many ingredients in the pot. Newman reports in his Epilogue that he did research in thirty-three states at more than one
hundred institutions and conducted more than one thousand interviews (pp. 640-42). As the Tinker episode illustrates, however, the
enormous archive of data does not necessarily always come together to create an illuminating context or to provide a persuasive
explanation of Black's motivations or objectives. The wisdom of
Justice Black's convictions is self-evident, at least in his opinions
before his last few years on the Court, of which Mr. Newman reluctantly concedes that "Black's Constitution had become all anchor
and no sail, all umbra and no penumbra. As he aged and his tendons shrank, so did the joints in his Constitution lose their elasticity" (p. 594).
9. LAURA

KALmAN,

ABE FORTAS: A BIOGRAPHY 321 (1990) (footnotes omitted).
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Justice Black's retreat from an expansive application of the Bill
of Rights - at least of the First and Fifth Amendments - poses
only one of the paradoxical puzzles of his thirty-four plus years on
the bench. In an unsparing essay that deserves more attention than
it is likely to receive, Michael Klarman declares: ,
Black, who had joined the Ku Klux Klan in 1923 to enhance both his
budding political career and his credibility as a litigator performing
before Klan-dominated Alabama juries, developed a reputation as
one of history's great defenders of minority rights. Black, the Bible
Belt Baptist, authored most of the Court's strict church/state separation opinions of the post-war era. And Black, a hero (along with
Douglas) to millions of mid-century political liberals, compiled a voting record during his last half dozen years that can only be described
as reactionary - dissenting, sometimes alone, in cases such as Griswold, Harper, Katz, Witherspoon, Hunter v. Erickson, Sniadach,
Tinker, Goldberg,Winship, Boddie and Cohen v. California(and seriously contemplating doing so in Swann).'0
Mr. Newman casts little light on these problems. Everson v. Board
of Education l and McCollum v. Board of Education12 - the watershed church and state cases - are dispatched in five pages,
largely with quotes from others. The late cases, beginning with
Griswold, tend to get short shift, if any, perhaps because they collectively belong to the "anchor" period of Black's constitutional
thought.
The presentation of Black's Klan membership is the most unsatisfying treatment in the book, though it is not clear whether Black
or Newman is more at fault. The basic facts of his involvement are
now well-known. Black joined the Klan in 1923. Fearing unfavorable publicity in the future, he executed a letter of resignation in July
of 1925, which he left on file with local Klan officials. He then proceeded to campaign for the U.S. Senate as the Klan's implicit candidate in the 1926 election. After a decade in the Senate, where
Black fought aggressively for the New Deal in general and for organized labor in particular, President Franklin D. Roosevelt named
Black in 1937 to fill the first Supreme Court vacancy in Roosevelt's
administration. Following Black's confirmation, a newspaper reporter broke the Klan story - complete with photostatic copies of
relevant documents - and a political firestorm erupted. President
Roosevelt was acutely embarrassed, and Black was under pressure
to resign from the Court even before he formally took his seat. The
storm subsided only after Black made an eleven-minute national
radio broadcast, heard by the second largest audience in history;
Edward VII's abdication speech the previous year was first.
10. Michael Klarman, Book Review, 12 L. & Is. REv. 399, 401 (1994).

11. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
12. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
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Black's brief statement made two points: that he had been a member of the Klan for a short time, but, at greater length, that he vigorously opposed bigotry in all forms. He took his seat on the
Supreme Court three days later.
Newman devotes an entire chapter, almost twelve pages, to the
Klan question. From 1937 on, Black was highly defensive about his
prior Klan membership. Newman recounts nearly a dozen explanations from the Justice about why he joined in the first place - most
of which Black provided privately to friends and staff over a period
of thirty years. Some of the excuses contradict each other, and the
cumulative effect has the ring of special pleading. He was a joiner,
and the Klan was simply one more fraternal order (p. 99); or, the
Klan was so powerful socially and politically in Birmingham that he
could not afford not to join (pp. 96-97); he never gave a dime to the
Klan; or he paid ten dollars so that a Klan recruiter would stop
pestering him (p. 96). He provided the least plausible excuse to a
friend during his first month on the Court: "When I joined the
Klan, it was not anti-Catholic or anti-Jewish. With other progressive Democrats, I went in to prevent it from falling into the hands
of machine politicians. We succeeded and I quit when I saw the
Klan was going in the wrong direction" (p. 98). Twenty years later,
he told a group of law clerks, "if you wanted to be elected to the
Senate in Alabama in the 1920s, you'd join the Klan too" (p. 100).
The nagging question is not what Black's motivations in fact
were in 1923, but what effect a lifetime of guilt had on his judicial
career. Newman never accuses Black of calculation, but he strongly
implies that early in Black's career the Justice inflated his rhetoric
in opinions condemning racial discrimination for instrumental reasons that included enhancing his own standing within and without
the Court. During his first two years on the Court, by Newman's
account, Black worked fourteen hours a day with only modest results. His early opinions often sounded like Senate speeches, and
Justice Harlan Fiske Stone indiscreetly criticized Black's work to
the columnist Marquis Childs, who promptly reported Stone's complaint. Stone even wrote Felix Frankfurter at Harvard Law School
and suggested that he surreptitiously tutor Black (p. 275). To Newman, Chambers v. Florida,13 in October Term 1939, provided Black
with the opportunity to prove himself to his colleagues and to expiate his youthful fraternal sins. Black wrote a forceful opinion for
the Court in Chambers invalidating the criminal convictions of
young black defendants who had been subjected to the third degree. "Any doubts about Black's commitment to the Constitution
and civil liberties," writes Newman, "were quickly stilled. Com13. 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
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mentators heaped praise on him; to his supporters it was vindication" (p. 283).
Black's vindication was compromised four years later. For the
consummate liberal, Korematsu v. United States' 4 is as inexplicable
as it is disgraceful. Writing for a six-man majority, Black sustained
the constitutionality of the compulsory removal of one hundred and
twenty thousand residents of Japanese descent - including seventy
thousand citizens and fifty thousand aliens - from the West Coast
during World War H. Black justified the military order on the
ground of practical exigencies: "Pressing public necessity may
sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; racial antagonism never can.' u Eugene Rostow condemned the decision in The
Yale Law Journal,'6 and it quickly became the Dred Scott of its day.
The question about Korematsu is why Black felt he had to justify
the executive order, especially on constitutional grounds. The point
is far from hypothetical. Until the last minute, Justice Douglas was
prepared to dissent and had circulated an opinion dissenting on
statutory rather than constitutional grounds. The split among the
Justices was thus 5-4, with Black holding the decisive vote. One
wonders, though Newman does not ask, why Black did not adopt
Douglas's position. The wartime necessity justification was no
longer relevant; two weeks after the court announced its decision,
the Army canceled the total exclusion order. Was Black reluctant
to second-guess judicially the ailing President whom he had embarrassed at the time of his appointment? Was he even more unwilling
to condemn constitutionally General John L. DeWitt, who issued
the exclusion order and who was an old Alabama friend (indeed,
the man with whom Black briefly stayed when he was elected to the
Senate in 1926)? Newman reports that Korematsu "troubled Black
for the rest of his life" (p. 318), but not enough for him to recant his
role - unlike Earl Warren, who supported exclusion as Attorney
General of California but who declared it "wrong" in his
Memoirs.'7 Justice Black was unrepentant to an interviewer in
1967:
I would do precisely the same thing today, in any part of the country.
I would probably issue the same order were I President. We had a
situation where we were at war. People were rightly fearful of the
Japanese in Los Angeles, many loyal to the United States, many undoubtedly not, having dual citizenship - lots of them. They all look
alike to a person not a Jap. [p. 318]
14. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). See ROGER DANELS, THE DECISION TO RELOCATE THE JAPANESE AMERcANs (1975); PETER IRONS, JUSTrCE AT WAR (1983).

15. 323 U.S. at 216.
16. Eugene V. Rostow, The JapaneseAmerican Cases - A Disaster,54 YALE L.J. 489
(1945).
17. EARL WARREN, TnE MEMOIRS OF CI JusnCE EARL WARREN 149 (1977).

May 1995]

Hugo Black Among Friends

1891

The sentiment chillingly echoes General DeWitt's testimony to a
congressional committee more than twenty-five years before, which
Newman quotes: "A Jap's a Jap. It makes no difference whether
he's an American citizen or not. There is no way to determine their
loyalty" (p. 313). Black's identification with General DeWitt's
"plight" suggests that the Justice always saw the case from the perspective of the policymaker on the scene and not from the perspective the judge faced with creating constitutional, or at least
statutory, precedent. Black made a career of condemning judges
who used the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to substitute their policy judgments for those of legislators and administrators. Korematsu stands as a lesson learned too
well.
If Korematsu was the personal low point of Black's judicial career, Adamson v. California18 was the high point. Black's dissent in
Adamson argued that the Due Process Clause of section one of the
Fourteenth Amendment "incorporated" the protections of the first
eight Amendments against the actions of the states. It was his
"most important" opinion, Black told Newman, "no question about
it" (p. 352). Newman adds little to previous accounts of the substance of the Adamson debate. He concedes that "Black's was an
advocate's history: he proved too much and ignored or swept away
all doubtful evidence" (p. 354). And, once more, we hear about
Black's thin skin: he suspected Frankfurter-of instigating Charles
Fairman's forceful critique in the Stanford Law Review1 9 in return
for Fairman "get[ting] a job at Harvard" (pp. 356-57). Black even
considered, but abandoned, having his law clerk, Louis Oberdorfer,
write a rebuttal to Fairman (p. 357). "Like the snake that kept rising up, Fairman's article was always on Black's mind," Newman
says. "He had no doubt he was right historically" (p. 359). In any
event, Black was deeply invested in his position. He had staked his
intellectual reputation on the opinion, and his entire judicial strategy depended on developing a formula for restricting judicial discretion in the interpretation of the Due Process Clauses while
nonetheless reaching what he viewed as liberal results. Or as he
told an interviewer in 1967: "If I didn't find that this was [the section one drafters'] view, my career on the Court would have been
entirely different. I would not have gone with due process and I'd
be considered the most reactionary judge on the Court" (p. 353)

-

evidently an unacceptable consequence.
Or at least it was until 1964. Newman explains Black's drift to
"the other side from those liberals" (p. 543 quoting Black) as a
18. 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
19. Charles Fairman, Does the 14th Amendment Incorporatethe Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding,2 STAN. L. REv. 5 (1949).
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function of events overtaking the man. The critical case, according
to Newman, was Bell v. Maryland,20 involving sit-ins:
Formerly [Black] had treated dissenters as heroes indispensable to
progress, who helped the country live up to its highest aspirations.
Now he disparaged protest groups and their leaders: he considered
them ambitious, misinformed, dangerous agitators. A very different
Black was focusing on constitutional limitations of a very different
sort. [p. 551]
Newman mentions in passing two other factors that influenced
Black, but they require more emphasis. First, the Court had
changed, and for the first time in two decades, Black was no longer
its philosophical leader. Warren, Douglas, Brennan, and Goldberg,
later replaced by Fortas, did not share Black's anxieties about using
the Due Process Clauses expansively. Personally, Black was alienated from the liberal wing of the Court. Douglas, always more an
ally than a friend, had fallen from grace in Black's eyes due to his
colorful personal life. Goldberg and Fortas were unshaken by
Black's growing peevishness, which seems to have made Black dig
into his new positions even more deeply. Second, street protest offended Black's sense of order, particularly as it exploded bloodily in
the South. To protect the protester was to sanction violence, which
Black found incongruent with the Constitution. Black had been reviled in many parts of Alabama for supporting the desegregation
decisions in 1954 and 1955, and his reputational wounds from that
period were finally healing. Constitutionalizing sit-ins threatened
the rapprochement. Newman quotes remarks from Warren that
ring true, even if they reflect no credit on either Justice: "Hugo just
wants to be buried in Alabama" (p. 551).
Still, Hugo Black had one "grand finale" (p. 613) in him - New
York Times v. United States,2 1 the Pentagon Papers Case - which
he thought was "the most important First Amendment opinion of
his career" (p. 617). Newman tries to crank up a dramatic climax to
square with Black's estimation of his swan song, but neither the
political nor the doctrinal stakes seem to match the Justice's pride
of authorship. Nonetheless, Newman concludes: "The nation survived the publication of the Pentagon papers; indeed it became
stronger as a result. Without such cases and without judges willing
to affirm the commands of the First Amendment, the sounds of
hobnailed boots might well be heard marching in the night" (p. 619;
footnote omitted).
The Pentagon Papers episode provides a monumental conclusion to what Newman designed as a monumental book. The monument commemorates Black's civil rights jurisprudence, especially
20. 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
21. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
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his opinions on the First Amendment, rather than his entire judicial
career. Perhaps six hundred richly detailed pages of text is enough.
Black, however, was more than the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment. He had a reputation within the Court as a
master tactician who worked well with very different people and
who used his forensic and temperamental skills to great advantage.
Newman quotes Justice Harry Blackmun as recalling that even in
his eighties, Black was a "canny, lovable manipulator... ever the
politician, ever the Senator still" (p. 601). Newman never shows us
examples of those talents in action, which is a shame. Newman's
substantive omissions are even more unsatisfactory. He barely
touches on Black's judicial view of the Commerce Clause, a critical
issue during the New Deal, and he provides only one paragraph on
the civil jury - one of Black's great passions. 22 Newman totally
neglects Black's important writings on antitrust law,2 federal jurisdiction and abstention,24 and labor law.25 The final omission is the
least understandable. Black's political career in Alabama was
rooted in the labor movement, and his crowning achievement in the
Senate was federal minimum-wage legislation. His judicial opinions
never shirked from protecting the rights of labor, statutory or constitutional.26 Notwithstanding the gaps in coverage, and they are
far from trivial, Hugo Black has been fortunate in his chosen biographer. Mr. Newman is sympathetic, to say the least: Black's enemies are his enemies, and Black's friends, often literally, are his
friends. Author and subject were obviously comfortable with each
other. The resulting volume may include a few unattractive vignettes but nothing that would threaten friendship.

22. See, e.g., Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962); Beacon Theatres v. Westover,
359 U.S. 500 (1959).
23. See, e.g., United States v. Von's Grocery, 384 U.S. 270 (1966); Eastern R.R. Presidents
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight Co., 365 U.S. 127 (1961); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale
Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Tfnken Roller Bearing v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951);
Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951); AP v. United States, 326
U.S. 1 (1945).
24. See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971).
25. See generally Ivan C. Rutledge, Justice Black and Labor Law, 14 UCLA L. REv. 501
(1967). When Justice Frankfurter mounted a campaign against review of pro-employer judgments under the Federal Employer's Liability Act (FELA), Black led the successful counterattack. See Dennis J. Hutchinson, Felix Frankfurterand the Business of the Supreme Court;
O.T. 1946-0.T. 1961, 1980 Sup. Or. Ray. 143, 155.
26. See, e.g., Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice, 336 U.S. 490 (1949); Milk Wagon Drivers'
Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287,299 (1941) (Black, J., dissenting); Milk Wagon
Drivers' Union v. Lake Valley Co., 311 U.S. 91 (1940).

